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Security Information

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PROBABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN YUGOSLAVIA

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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YUGOSLAV ECONOMIC STABILITY: Adjustment to Foreign
Economic Aid Reduction and Withdrawal

I. The Necessity for Adjustment

In the light of present and prospective tripartite policy with respect to economic aid to Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav economy will face the need of adjusting to two serious problems in the field of foreign economic relations during the next few years. The first of these is a sharp reduction in foreign economic aid available in fiscal years 1953-54 and 1954-55, as compared to earlier years, and possibly complete withdrawal of all economic aid thereafter. The second problem is the heavy burden of debts to be serviced during this period.

A. Foreign Economic Aid

In evaluating the effect which the reduction and eventual withdrawal of tripartite economic aid would have on the Yugoslav economy, it is useful to review the economic situation in Yugoslavia when aid was initiated in late 1950, the volume of that aid up to the present time, and the contribution which it has thus far made to Yugoslav economic stability.

Following the break with the USSR in 1948, Yugoslavia was approaching an economic crisis, which was hastened by the serious drought in 1950. The crisis was due largely to the two major goals of Yugoslav policy following the Cominform break. They were, on the one hand, the building up of a defense establishment capable of deterring the Soviet and satellite states from aggression, and, on the other hand, the carrying through of an investment program intended to establish the economic independence of Yugoslavia.

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In the period between the break with the Cominform and the receipt of grant aid from the West, which began in early 1951, the Yugoslav Government maintained the numerical strength of its already large armed forces, although it was unable to improve its equipment and materiel during this period.

In order to maintain the army and continue investments according to the Five Year Plan, (originally 1947-51) the government attempted to meet the import needs by increasing exports to the highest possible level. The difficulties encountered in finding sufficient export surpluses and developing new export markets necessitated further measures: gold and foreign exchange reserves were drawn down from \$59 million in the middle of 1948 to \$17.5 million at the beginning of 1950 and trade agreement swing credits were utilized to the limit and beyond and were employed on what became in effect a long-term credit basis amounting to \$54 million at the end of 1950. In addition, the government was able to obtain credits from foreign governments and private banks equal to slightly less than \$200 million by the end of 1950. Some of these credits were granted by Western European countries eager to gain and regain export markets for their reviving heavy industries. All these measures were designed to permit down-payments on long-term contracts for capital goods and immediate payments for raw materials and certain types of easily obtainable capital goods. (See Section IC for discussion of the effects of these measures on the Yugoslav balance of payments in these years.)

Thus, plans and actual long-term preparations involving commitments of funds abroad, in the form of contracts and initial financing, took place with reference not only to defense but also to investment before United States drought relief and then tripartite economic aid were begun. As a result of the long-term preparations associated with their accomplishment,

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two major sectors of the economy -- defense and investment -- had already assumed large and somewhat rigid proportions before this aid began, and thus circumscribed somewhat the influence the tripartite powers were able to exert on the Yugoslav economy, directly or indirectly through the aid.

1. Volume and Importance of Foreign Economic Aid

Large-scale grant aid to Yugoslavia by the West began when that country, struggling to reorient its trade as a result of the Cominform blockade, experienced a serious drought in the summer of 1950. Yugoslavia turned to the West for help, which was extended with the aim of maintaining an economy capable of withstanding Soviet pressure. The United States granted about \$65 million of Emergency Relief Assistance and United States voluntary relief organizations distributed about \$25 million of United States Government surplus food stocks. Most of this aid was delivered to Yugoslavia in the first half of 1951.

During the first months of 1951 it became evident that the Yugoslav economy had reached a critical stage in respect to raw materials and the United States Government extended \$29 million of aid from MDAP funds for the purchase of raw materials. In the late spring of 1951, the United States, United Kingdom and France met in London to study Yugoslavia's overall economic situation and to determine how they might best promote their interests in Yugoslavia.

The most important reason for the granting of economic aid to Yugoslavia by the West was to assure the viability and independence of Yugoslavia from the Soviet Bloc in order to assure access to Yugoslavia in time of war without having to assault it, while at the same time denying to the Kremlin its physical possession and control. This aid was extended

Table IA-1: Summary of Economic Aid to Yugoslavia, 1951- FY 1953/4
(in millions of dollars)

	CY 1951	FY 1950/51	FY 1951/52	FY 1952/53	FY 1953/54 (projected)
I. Grants					
A. Tripartite Aid					
1. US	32.5	0	78.0 2/	109.0 2/	60.0 2/
2. UK	11.5	0	27.6	12.6	8.4
3. France	6.0	0	14.4	8.4	5.6
Total	50.0	0	120.0	130.0	74.0
B. Other Economic Aid					
1. US Food Grants					
a. 1950 Emergency	0	50.0	0	0	0
b. MDAF Food	0	15.2	0	0	0
2. US MDAF Raw materials	29.0	29.0	0	0	0
3. US CARE Program)	23.6	27.8	.5	0	0
Other voluntary Relief)					
4. France, Food Aid	1.0	1.0	0	0	0
5. Belgium, Food Aid	0.2	0.2	0	0	0
Total	53.8	123.2	.5	0	0
Total, all grants	103.8	123.2	120.5	130.0	74.0
II. Actual Shipments					
Total, all programs	148.6	89.0	127.5	137.2	75.0

- Does not include \$2.25 million advanced from fiscal year 1952-53 program late in fiscal year 1951-52.
- Original grant of \$78 million plus drought emergency grants of \$20 million in January 1953 and \$11 million in May 1953. Does not include \$15 million advanced from fiscal year 1953-54 program in June 1953.
- Includes \$15 million advanced in June 1953.

NOTE: The difference between the figures in this table and those in Annex I Table 1 is largely due to the inclusion here of specific grants in the fiscal year in which they are likely to be used, rather than in the fiscal year when actually made, as is the case in Annex I Table 1. See footnotes below table for specific grants thus treated.

Table IA-2: Relative Importance of Grant Aid

	<u>1951</u>	<u>FY 1951-52</u>	<u>FY 1952-53</u>	<u>FY 1953-54</u> <u>(Projected)</u>
Grant Aid Shipments (\$ million) <u>a/</u>	148.6	127.5	137.2	75.0
Total Availabilities (\$ million) <u>b/</u>	n.a.	3,818.0	3,524.0	3,895.0
Aid as % of Total Availabilities	n.a.	3.0	3.9	1.9
Population (millions) <u>c/</u>	16.5	16.7	16.9	17.2
Distribution of aid per capita (\$)	9.0	7.6	8.1	4.4
Per capita consumption (\$) <u>d/</u>	n.a.	112.6	100.5	118.8
Aid as % of per capita consumption	n.a.	6.7	8.1	3.7
Total imports (\$ million) <u>e/</u>	390.8	357.9	408.3	326.4
Aid as % of total imports	38.0	35.6	33.2	23.2
Net balance of trade and services (\$ million) <u>f/</u>	- 238.4	- 88.0	- 217.0	- 84.0
Aid as % of net balance of trade and services	62.3	114.9	63.2	89.2
Capital goods imports <u>g/</u>	n.a.	92.1	120.0	69.0
Aid as % of capital goods imports	n.a.	138.5	114.3	108.7

a. From Table IA-1.

b. Total availabilities (Gross National Product minus net balance of trade and services). From Annex I table 4.

c. Bureau of Census estimates.

d. From Annex I table 4.

e. 1950-52 imports from Statistics of Foreign Trade of the YFPR; later years estimated by FOA.

f. From Annex I, table 6.

g. Source for 1951-52 IBRD - Current Economic Developments and Credit Worthiness of Yugoslavia, January 1953; later years estimated by FOA.

n.a. --Not available.

to Yugoslavia to meet current needs rather than support long term projects. As a result of this conference the tripartite aid program was initiated and agreement was reached on extending aid amounting to a maximum of \$125 million for the fiscal year July 1, 1951 to June 30, 1952. Aid amounting to \$120 million was finally authorized, with the United States furnishing 65 percent, the United Kingdom 23 percent, and France 12 percent.

Table IA-1 shows the amounts of foreign economic aid granted to Yugoslavia from the 1950 drought to the present time, with a projection of aid for the fiscal year 1953-54, as well as the actual shipments of aid-financed goods in those years. In accordance with the purposes of the program, goods purchased with tripartite aid have consisted predominantly of raw materials; textile raw materials have accounted for between 33 and 40 percent of the total shipments to date, coke for 10 percent, crude rubber and hides combined for 7-10 percent. In fiscal year 1952-53, because of the drought emergency, large amounts of grain were included in the aid.

Table IA-2 shows the relative quantitative importance of grant-aid shipments by comparing them with estimated total Yugoslav availabilities, per capita consumption, total imports, the balance of trade and services, and capital goods imports. Although tripartite aid shipments have not accounted for more than 3.9 percent of total availabilities (gross national product minus net balance of trade and services), their real significance becomes evident when it is shown that they equaled a third or more of total imports.

As compared to the deficit in the net balance of trade and services, they amounted to between two-thirds and one and a half times this deficit.

In determining the importance of Western aid to Yugoslavia, account must also be taken of loans and credits (see section IC) and military aid

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(see section IIA), even though the latter does not enter into commercial trade channels. Consideration should also be given to technical assistance which is very important qualitatively, although not significant in monetary terms.

Although foreign economic aid has been used to finance current imports and not capital goods imports, it is worth noting that foreign aid shipments have been greater than capital goods imports in each year aid has been extended. This illustrates the way in which foreign aid, in conjunction with foreign loans, has indirectly permitted Yugoslavia to pursue its investment program. The relationship appears to be somewhat similar between foreign aid shipments and the defense share of imports, which is estimated by FOA to have been roughly 25-30 percent of the total imports in recent years.

Viewed either from the standpoint of the Yugoslav program alone or from comparison with economic aid and its effects on other countries, the non-statistical evidences of the importance of tripartite economic aid to Yugoslavia are even more impressive than these aggregate relationships would indicate. Omitting consideration here of its political effects, the major results of aid during the past three years appear to be five: maintenance of defense establishment, avoidance of possible famines resulting from droughts, effect on government's agricultural program, facilitation of foreign loans, and effect on general economic policies of the government ("New Economic System").

a. The maintenance of an effective defense establishment as a deterrent to Soviet Bloc attack was a primary result of tripartite aid. It is not possible to demonstrate statistically the effect which tripartite aid has had on Yugoslav defense capabilities. It is clear, however, that Yugoslavia was enabled to continue supporting a military establishment which is

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believed to be among the largest in non-Soviet Europe despite the effects of the Cominform break and two major droughts. The Yugoslav armed forces have claimed a larger part of the country's national product (over 15% from 1951 to 1953) than has been the case in any Western country, not excluding the United States. Furthermore, during the period of economic aid the Yugoslav economy has been able to undertake the construction of basic military industry for producing a large part of the materiel necessary to maintain its own forces. Some of these plants are in operation today.

b. Another primary factor related to the granting of economic aid to Yugoslavia has been its effectiveness in avoiding famine or near-famine conditions as a result of the 1950 and 1952 droughts. Aside from humanitarian grounds, it was essential to prevent the economic disorganization and political and social unrest which would have been caused by a forced drastic cut in food consumption. It is not possible to assess fully what the effect of the 1950 drought might have been had it not been followed by United States food aid and tripartite economic aid. It appears, however, that this aid did, in fact, provide the gap between possible widespread hunger and the relative social and political calm that actually prevailed. The American observers in Yugoslavia in 1950-51 reported that, to their knowledge, the distribution of United States relief was well organized so that not a single case of starvation came to their attention. From the standpoint of economic and political stability, the results of the 1952 drought were not quite as serious. Food and animal fodder from the previous year's good harvest and supplies of consumers' goods in excess of consumer demand existed in shops and warehouses -- both in marked contrast to the circumstances prevailing at the time of the 1950 drought. These features are in themselves evidences of an increase in stability, both in economic and in the less assessable political form of

stability which differentiated the two periods of drought.

c. There is a close connection between economic aid and the government's agricultural policy, but it is not possible to determine positively what this policy would have been in the absence of aid. The two droughts have brought the continually worsening agricultural problem to the forefront and the government was forced to make alterations in its policy of promoting collectives at any cost. Actually, economic aid might have been instrumental in permitting the Yugoslav Government to postpone the necessary agricultural reforms, as the foodstuffs received under the aid lessened somewhat the dependence of the government on the private sector in agriculture as it could feed the cities and continue non-food imports out of its own resources. On the other hand, in the absence of food and tripartite aid, the government might have tried to solve its problem by even more severe measures against the peasants in its efforts to control the country's agricultural supplies. On balance, it would seem that the aid has probably delayed the abolishment of certain unproductive collective farms, but it has given the government a chance to review its agrarian policies, and to make careful plans for the elimination of the inadequacies.

Although the government has been searching for a final solution to its agricultural problem, no such solution appears in sight as yet and more experimentation will undoubtedly take place before the problem is solved to the satisfaction of the government and the peasants (see section IIC).

d. A significant by-product of the tripartite aid program as well as the three United States credits made available through the Export-Import Bank in 1949-50 and the United Kingdom credits in 1950-51 has been the increased willingness of other investors to lend money to Yugoslavia.

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The amount of tripartite aid and the funding of the Yugoslav debts to the tripartite powers were important considerations in the determination of the International Bank to extend two loans to Yugoslavia. It may also be surmised that Yugoslavia might have found it more difficult to obtain the Chase Bank, Turkish, and Canadian short-term credits to which it resorted in order to obtain grain imports following the 1952 drought if it had not been the recipient of economic aid with which to support the stability of its economy.

e. Finally, a very intangible result of the economic aid has been its effect on the general economic policies of the Yugoslav Government. The Yugoslavs have argued that the introduction of the so-called "New Economic System" (see Annex III) with its apparent liberalization entitles them to a continuation of large-scale economic aid; they claim that they will not be able to proceed with the implementation of the program unless the aid is continued. This argument makes two assumptions. Firstly, it assumes that in granting economic aid to Yugoslavia, the United States was acting on the premise that the Tito Government would gradually evolve into a democratic regime. It seems clear that while any real liberalization in Yugoslavia would be very welcome, the basis for the extension of US aid was to prevent the subjection of Yugoslavia by the Soviet Bloc. Secondly, while economic aid has undoubtedly assisted in the implementation of the "New Economic System" by assuring the government of relative economic stability in this trying period, it was not the primary cause of the change in Yugoslav economic policy. It must be remembered that the current trend in Yugoslav economic and political thinking had already started before the drought in the summer of 1950, i.e., before tripartite aid was extended. (See Annex III.)

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The basic cause for the introduction of the "New Economic System" was the realization on the part of Yugoslav leaders that the existing Soviet-style system had not proved successful and that some substitute had to be found. The propaganda value of the "liberalizing" features of the system was a useful by-product. As in the case of the agrarian policies discussed above, it is difficult to determine what course the Yugoslav Government would have followed in the absence of economic aid, but the possibility cannot be excluded that it might have been forced to make more significant concessions to the population to stimulate production.

2. Future Aid Levels

a. Discussions on the level of economic aid to be extended to Yugoslavia during fiscal year 1953-54 began in Belgrade at the third tripartite conference, which completed its study of the Yugoslav requirements at the beginning of April 1953. This group estimated that Yugoslavia's balance of payments would require external financing of \$89 million in order to support the economy at a level of consumption consistent with the economic-military objectives of the assistance program.

In the conference's view, this deficit, which was \$8 million below Yugoslav estimates, should be financed by grant assistance of \$14 million from the British and French Governments and \$75 million from the United States. Upon review, however, it was decided that the United States share was about \$30 million above the level of assistance which the United States Government considered necessary and was willing to provide. However, in June 1953 aid amounting to \$15 million was advanced to Yugoslavia in addition to the fiscal year 1952-53 allotment, and furthermore the outgoing pipeline on June 30, 1952, turned out to be

larger than envisaged earlier. The utilization of the \$15 million and the drawing down of the pipeline in fiscal year 1953-54 will boost the available aid to an amount approaching the original estimate of \$89 million.

b. There is, as yet, no clearcut decision on the granting of economic aid to Yugoslavia after fiscal year 1953-54. At the present juncture, it appears that economic grant aid by United Kingdom and France will not continue after fiscal year 1953-54, the year in which the three governments originally estimated that a viable Yugoslav economy would be achieved. On the other hand, the United States has some very tentative long-range plans which provide for the continuance of grant assistance to Yugoslavia at a greatly reduced level for one or two years beyond fiscal year 1953-54. In addition to this, there will be continuing grants for military aid and probably for technical assistance as well.

B. Foreign Indebtedness and Servicing Burden

The necessity of servicing Yugoslavia's total foreign indebtedness of almost \$400 million (as of July 1, 1953) represents a serious obstacle to the balancing of Yugoslavia's foreign economic transactions in the near future. The planned reduction in foreign economic aid, coinciding with the peak demands for principal repayments on this debt, according to present contractual arrangements, places heavy demands on the Yugoslav economy in the next three years.

1. The Composition of Foreign Debt

The total of Yugoslav foreign indebtedness is estimated at \$395 million (excluding the prewar public debts¹) as of July 1, 1953, a \$20 million increase since January 1, 1953. (See Tables IB-1, IB-2, and IB-3.) The major part of this, \$257 million, consists of long-and medium-term credits; in addition, there are \$21 million short-term credits resulting from the 1952 drought, \$34 million of revolving or secured credits, \$40 million of swing credits under trade agreements, and \$43 million of nationalized property debts.

About two-thirds of the total indebtedness is concentrated among four major creditors, the United Kingdom, Western Germany, United States, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, each of which accounted for more than 15 percent of the total debt. The other third is divided among more than twenty other creditors, some of whom have extended extremely small credits to Yugoslavia, e.g., the combined credits of Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden totalled less than \$3 million on July 1, 1953.

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1. No final agreement on the total amount of these debts has yet been reached between the Yugoslavs and the creditors.

TABLE IB-1

Status of Yugoslav Foreign Debt
as of Jan. 1, 1953
(In millions of US dollars)

	Nationalized Property Debts	Loans and Credits			Swing Credits	Total
		Long-and Medium-Term	Short- Term	Revolving and Secured		
<u>Major Debts</u>						
United Kingdom	7.09	47.60	0	12.70	0	67.39
West Germany	0	42.40	1.10	0	22.30	65.80
United States	0	55.00	8.00	0	0	63.00
IBRD	0	28.00	0	0	0	28.00
Belgium	6.71	13.71	0	0	3.70	24.12
Switzerland	15.17	6.41	0	0	0	21.58
France	13.83	10.00	0	0	2.77	26.60
Austria	0	10.00	0	0	4.53	14.53
Canada	0	0	12.00	0	0	12.00
Turkey	0	0	18.00	0	0.63	18.63
IMF	0	0	0	9.00	0	9.00
BIS	0	0	0	7.25	0	7.25
Subtotal	42.80	213.12	39.10	28.95	33.93	357.90
<u>Minor Debts</u>						
	2.22	1.86	0	.60	12.49	17.17
TOTAL	45.02	214.98	39.10	29.55	46.42	375.07

TABLE IB-2

Estimated Status of Yugoslav Foreign Debt
as of July 1, 1953
(In millions of US dollars)

	Nationalized Property Debts	Loans and Credits			Swing Credits	Total
		Long- and Medium-Term	Short- Term	Revolving and Secured		
<u>Major Debts</u>						
United Kingdom	6.32	47.60	0	13.76		
West Germany	0	46.30	1.10	0		
United States	0	55.00	0	3.00		
IERD	0	58.00	0	0		
Belgium	6.48	16.61	0	0		
Switzerland	14.81	12.41	0	0		
France	13.63	10.70	0	0		
Austria	0	8.50	0	0		
Canada	0	0	8.60	0		
Turkey	0	0	11.00	0		
IMF	0	0	0	9.00		
BIS	0	0	0	7.25		
Subtotal	41.24	255.12	20.70	33.01		
		2.24	—	0.60		
<u>Minor Debts</u>	2.18	257.36	20.70	33.61		
Total	43.42				39.75	394.84
					Breakdown not available	Breakdown not available

TABLE IB-3

Status of Yugoslav Foreign Debt, 1951-1959 ^{a/}
(in millions of US dollars)

	1951		1952		1953		1954		1955		1956		1957		1958		1959	
	Jan. 1	July 1	Jan. 1	July 1	Jan. 1	July 1	Jan. 1	July 1	Jan. 1	July 1	Jan. 1	July 1	Jan. 1	July 1	Jan. 1	July 1	Jan. 1	July 1
Nat'l property debts	36.80	50.22	48.69	46.82	45.02	43.42	41.63	39.70	37.35	34.94	32.56	30.16	27.76	25.48	23.48	10.11		
Loans and credit	172.84	195.73	220.48	214.81	254.08	276.06	258.46	236.63	209.38	183.76	162.14	149.22	136.96	115.54	98.25			
Revolving and secured credits	20.28	27.07	29.55	22.19	29.55	33.61	27.83	15.11	7.36	2.00								
Subtotal	229.92	273.02	298.72	283.82	328.62	355.09	327.92	291.44	254.09	220.70	194.70	179.38	164.72	139.02	108.36			
Swing credits	53.75	54.14	37.82	36.30	44.91	39.75	40.12	39.62	33.00	27.00	21.00	15.00	10.00	5.00				
TOTAL	283.67	327.16	336.54	320.12	373.53	394.84	368.04	331.06	287.09	247.70	215.70	194.38	174.72	144.02	108.36			

^{a/} On the assumption that no new debts will be contracted.

Source: Annex 1, Table 2.

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TABLE IB-4

Contraction of Yugoslav Foreign Debt

	Pre-1950	1950		1951		1952		1953
		Jan-June	July-Dec.	Jan-June	July-Dec.	Jan-June	July-Dec.	Jan-June
Nationalized Property Debts	45.43	0	0.20	15.03	0	0	0	0
Loans and Credits	49.71	38.57	88.40	32.08	31.77	14.63	42.97	44.98
Revolving and Secured Credits	23.00	5.50	0	5.00	0.40	0	7.45	0
Totals	118.14	44.07	88.60	52.11	32.17	14.63	50.42	44.98
Swing Credits	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	6.85	0.87	7.37	15.31	--
Total Debt				58.96	33.04	22.00	65.73	44.98

n.a.--Not available.

Source: Annex I, Table 3.

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2. The Contraction of the Debt

The greater part of the nationalized property debt and of the revolving or secured credits was contracted before 1950 (see Table IB-4). The contraction of other loans and credits has continued up to the present. ^{million} \$50/ was secured by Yugoslavia before 1950, and an average of \$40 million each half year thereafter. The greatest number of credits, involving the largest increase in indebtedness (\$88 million), were obtained during the second half of 1950, following that year's drought. On the other hand, the smallest increase in this type of indebtedness (\$15 million) occurred in the first half of 1952, following the good 1951 harvest.

The loans and credits were secured, in general, for two purposes: short-term credits in fiscal years 1950-51 and 1952-53 to finance imports of food occasioned by the droughts in those years, and credits of all types (long, medium, short-term, revolving and secured) to finance imports of capital goods and raw materials for Yugoslav industry. The second type might be classified under two categories according to the criteria established by the International Monetary Fund: compensatory financing (for the purpose of balancing imbalances in Yugoslavia's foreign economic transactions) and non-compensatory (independent of the balance of payments and generally limited to specific projects). However, this separation is very difficult to perform and is in many cases conceptually inappropriate, as it is often impossible to distinguish developmental from balance of payments purposes.

3. \$380 Million Ceiling Set by IERD

In its October 1951 report on the creditworthiness of Yugoslavia

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the IBRD estimated that Yugoslav total indebtedness (excluding prewar public debts and swing credits) equalled approximately \$180 million as of September 1950. At that time the Bank's management recommended that Yugoslav borrowings in the next few years be limited to an additional \$200 million, thus setting a ceiling of \$380 million on Yugoslav foreign indebtedness. This limit was derived in the following manner: it was estimated that Yugoslavia would be able to meet debt service payments in all currencies of about \$30 million annually. This amount could service a total debt of about \$380 million on a long-term basis (20-25 year maturity at an average interest cost of 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ %) in addition to some payment on prewar public debts.

The ceiling of \$380 million has not been reached up to the present time, the total outstanding debt of about \$355 million on July 1, 1953 (excluding prewar public debts and swing credits) representing the highest peak. It should be noted that the Bank's calculation is not realistic in certain respects: with normal agricultural harvests, and a reduction in capital imports at the completion of the key investment program Yugoslavs might be able to spend more than \$30 million a year on debt servicing. However, according to present contractual arrangements over two-thirds of the Yugoslav debt is to be amortized by the end of 1958 and none of the credits, except for those from IBRD, have a maturity of more than 10 years, so the assumption regarding the 20-25 year maturity is not realistic. Furthermore, swing credits amounting to about \$40 million on July 1, 1953 are expected to be eliminated by the end of 1958. This would necessitate an additional average yearly payment of approximately \$10 million, requiring export balances that otherwise might be used to service loans and credits.

4. Debt Servicing

While the total amount of external debt is within Yugoslav capabilities

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to service as determined by the IBRD, much of it is short- and medium-term debt which requires substantial principal repayments in the next three years. During fiscal years 1953-54, 1954-55 and 1955-56 contractual repayments amount to \$178 million, and even if repayments on the emergency wheat credits resulting from the 1952 drought are excluded, there still remains about \$160 million or an average of \$53 million a year to repay unless some debts are funded. (See Table IB-5.)

During the same period, contractual interest payments will amount to about \$27 million. Thus a total of about \$62 million a year (excluding wheat credits) is to be paid in the next three years, or twice the amount estimated by the International Bank as within Yugoslavia's capacity to service. To this must still be added an estimated average of \$11 million a year for expected swing reductions in this period. However, if no new loans were obtained, the contractual debt repayments would taper off sharply after the next three years, with only \$21 million remaining to be repaid in calendar year 1957 and \$17 million in calendar year 1958, plus \$8 million in 1957 and \$7 million in 1958 for interest charges (see Annex I, Table 2). This is, of course, only hypothetical, as it is likely that Yugoslavia will secure new loans and that some of the existing loans would be funded, thus raising the debt-servicing charges in the later years.

In the past, Yugoslavia has always received more in new loans in any one year than she needed to service existing loans during that period, the only exception being the fiscal year 1951-52 when a good harvest permitted a slight reduction in the total outstanding debt. In addition, in each year Yugoslavia was the recipient of foreign aid in an amount considerably greater than contractual debt servicing. This is not to say that tripartite aid was granted to Yugoslavia for the purpose of servicing its foreign debt, but the

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TABLE IB-5

**Total Yugoslav Contractual Debt Servicing,
January 1951-July 1956
(In millions of US dollars)**

	<u>1951</u>	<u>FY 1951/52</u>	<u>FY 1952/53</u>	<u>FY 1953/54</u>	<u>FY 1954/55</u>	<u>FY 1955/56</u>
Principal Repayments	26.61	40.95	30.00	64.60	71.74	42.32
Swing Reduction	23.65	26.08	11.86	9.50 ^{a/}	12.62 ^{a/}	12.00 ^{a/}
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Subtotal	50.26	67.03	41.86	74.10	84.36	54.32
Interest Payments	4.26	4.10	5.60	8.60	9.00	9.00
Total Debt Servicing	54.52	71.13	47.46	82.70	93.36	63.32

^{a/} Estimated

Source: Annex I, Table 2

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receipt of aid did facilitate the meeting of foreign debt obligations. In the future, with gradual elimination of foreign economic aid, Yugoslavia will have to meet these commitments out of her own resources.

5. Possibilities of Postponing Repayments

Yugoslavia has been able to negotiate postponements of debt-service payments in the case of three minor debts. Payments on the Swedish nationalized property debt due at the end of 1952 and the middle of 1953 were postponed for one year; the \$6 million Swiss equipment credit, originally due September 30, 1953, has been rescheduled with repayments now consisting of 10 semi-annual installments beginning on May 31, 1954; approximately \$4.8 million of repayments on the French military credit due in the period April 1953 to October 1954 have been deferred until the period April 1956 to October 1957.

Although these postponements have been of some help in improving Yugoslavia's foreign financial situation, no real amelioration of the problem of debt servicing during the next few years can be achieved without thoroughgoing adjustments in the West German and United Kingdom loans, each of which accounts for about 17 percent of the total outstanding Yugoslav foreign indebtedness. According to present contractual arrangements, Germany is to receive \$45 million over the next three years (not including swing reductions) and the United Kingdom \$39 million (not including nationalized property repayments). Since the total amount of scheduled repayments on loans and credits in those years amounts to \$162 million, West Germany and the United Kingdom together account for over 50 percent of the total. The other two major creditors, the United States and the IBRD, account for approximately

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the same proportion of present Yugoslav indebtedness as West Germany and the United Kingdom. However, the terms of these loans are relatively long and only \$6.5 million must be repaid on them during the next three years, so they create no problem within the present context.

The United Kingdom has recently made an offer to Yugoslavia to ease somewhat the debt servicing burden. The United Kingdom Government agrees that if the Yugoslavs pay off the revolving credits granted by the Midland and Westminster Banks when they fall due in fiscal year 1953-54, the United Kingdom Government will raise the ceiling of guarantees direct to exporters by an equivalent amount and will accept postponement of the \$2.8 million repayment on the 8 million pound credit, due on June 30, 1954, until 1956. The United Kingdom Government is also prepared to postpone repayments on the 8, 3, 2, and 4 million pound medium term loans if the Yugoslavs are able to obtain roughly equivalent concessions from other creditors, the most important of which is West Germany. Thus, the negotiations with Germany assume even greater importance; not only do present schedules provide for greater repayments to Germany than any other creditor, but the United Kingdom and other creditors are not willing to agree to any fundamental change in repayment terms unless Germany revises its schedules first.

The basic problem in the Yugoslav-German debt negotiations is the need to postpone payments on the medium-term debt (\$41.1 million outstanding as of July 1, 1953) and arrange suitable repayment terms for an additional \$16 million to pay for equipment recently ordered from Germany. These negotiations have been drawn out and complicated and no solution appeared possible until the German political situation became more settled. The

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possibilities for successful conclusion of these negotiations increased greatly with Chancellor Adenauer's victory at the polls in September 1953. The German Government has repeatedly assured the United States Government that it would do everything possible to come to some satisfactory agreement with Yugoslavia, but German Government agencies have heretofore been unwilling or unable to arrange for the funding of the debt and referred the Yugoslavs to a private German Bank, the Rheinische Girozentrale in Dusseldorf in the summer of 1953. The arrangements with this bank would have been satisfactory except for an interest rate of 8 percent and a fee of 2 percent, which the bank demanded and the Yugoslavs considered too high.

In view of Germany's interest in Yugoslavia as a market for its products and the assurances by the German Government, it appears likely that some arrangement would be reached postponing debt repayments. This would remove one of the obstacles in the way of agreements with other creditors and would be the first step toward adjusting debt servicing charges to Yugoslavia's ability to pay in the near future.

6. The Problem of Future Debt Contractions

All the debt tables and the discussions up to the present time have been based on the assumption that no new credits would be negotiated by the Yugoslav Government. Obviously, this is not a realistic assumption, and it is necessary to consider the effects of new loan contractions.

There are three factors inhibiting further loan contractions by Yugoslavia. The first and most important is the realization by the

Yugoslav Government that any new loans would increase the already great burden of debt repayments. The government has shown that it is aware of this danger by its regulations controlling the expansion of foreign borrowing by industrial and business enterprises. On the other hand, the desire of the Yugoslav leaders to industrialize the country further, as exemplified by recent mention of "new" key projects when the present ones are completed, provides a prime motive for increased foreign borrowing.

The second factor is the commitment by Yugoslavia under its loan agreements with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to "notify the Bank promptly of the particular proposal (to incur any additional external debt) and, before the proposed action is taken, shall afford to the Bank all opportunity which is reasonably practicable in the circumstances to exchange views with the borrower with respect thereto. . . ." There are two explicit and one implicit limitations on this requirement. The Yugoslav Government does not have to consult the Bank if the additional debt results from the utilization of an existing credit or if it is a short-term obligation under which repayment is to be completed within one year. The implicit limitation is the exemption from this requirement of a "reasonable" amount of compensation debt, i.e., debts which are to be repaid fully by exports out of the increased production of a specific commodity or commodities resulting directly from the loan.

The commitment to consult the Bank is, of course, tied closely to the \$300 million debt ceiling discussed above. Since the ceiling has

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not been reached and the total outstanding debt decreases gradually as principal repayments are affected, it would be possible for Yugoslavia to incur considerable new obligations without exceeding the \$380 million ceiling.

The third factor is the commitment by Yugoslavia under the Exchange of Notes of October 11, 1952, on the subject of tripartite aid, to "exchange views" with the United States, United Kingdom, and France whenever new loans outside the International Bank are contemplated. This requirement has not been strictly enforced in the past, and it appears now that in order to satisfy it Yugoslavia merely needs to report quarterly to the tripartite powers the status of unpaid balances of investment and commercial debts by governmental units and enterprises, rather than being forced to consult prior to conclusion of contracts.

Despite these three factors, it appears likely that Yugoslavia will attempt to secure further credits from foreign governments and non-governmental units. (See Section II-D.) An example is the attempt to add \$16 million to the existing medium-term debt to Germany and fund the combination of the two. This additional \$16 million is to cover the cost of new equipment recently ordered from Germany, allegedly for "key projects." According to the staff of the International Bank, many of the projects expected to receive this equipment are not of high priority and could easily have been postponed, but the Yugoslav Government continued to insist that all this equipment is essential.

It is not possible to estimate the amount of this additional indebtedness as this will depend on many factors, such as, the government's decision on the investment program, the military preparedness program

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and the level of private consumption, the ability to increase agricultural and other exports, and the success in postponing debt service charges falling due in the near future.

Obviously, the burden imposed by new debts depends on the purpose for which they are obtained and their repayment terms, i.e., the period when principal repayments must be made and the interest charges that are agreed upon rather than the total amount of the new debt. It is even conceivable, theoretically, that a new longer-term debt could reduce the short-term debt servicing burden if the proceeds were used to repay existing loans, thus, in effect funding them. However, future increases in the Yugoslav foreign indebtedness are likely to result from loans for investment purposes or short-term emergency credits, and not loans for funding purposes.

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C. The Basic Task of Adjustment in Aggregate Terms

A brief review, in aggregate terms, of some of the factors involved in Yugoslavia's postwar economic situation is necessary to express the scope of the problem of adjustment to a reduction and eventual withdrawal of foreign economic aid and an increased debt service burden. In this discussion, emphasis will be placed on the formation and distribution of the gross national product (GNP) and the fluctuations of the various elements of the balance of payments.

1. Formation and Distribution of GNP in Postwar Period

The contributions to the Yugoslav GNP by sectors of the economy and the growth of the GNP in postwar years are both presented in Table IC-1. The figures on GNP are subject to errors due to variations in price, classification, etc., but it is still possible to draw general conclusions from them, especially when supported by other data.

The Yugoslav GNP rose sharply from 1947 to 1949, decreased in 1950 due to the fall in agricultural production as a result of the drought, and then rose to about the 1949 level. The figures for 1951 and 1952 were calculated from the plans of those years; the 1951 plan was generally fulfilled, but in 1952 the second serious drought in three years caused a serious underfulfillment of the plan, and it is estimated that GNP in 1952 was only about 90 percent of the 1951 level (see Annex I, Table 4). It is expected that in 1953 GNP would again reach the 1951 level and possibly exceed it by a small amount.

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As shown in Table IC-1, industry's share of GNP rose sharply from 1947 to 1949 and then leveled off at around 45 percent of GNP; this same conclusion is indicated by a study of data on production of selected industrial commodities in Table IC-2, IC-3, and Annex I, Table 5.

Agriculture's share has been consistently about one-third of the total, except in times of drought when it fell to only about one-fourth of GNP. Table IC-4 presents data on Yugoslav grain production, which constitutes the most important sector of Yugoslav agriculture. The contribution to GNP of services has fluctuated between 20 and 30 percent of the total during this period.

Unfortunately, no comparable data are available for the distribution of GNP in the postwar years. The only data available were calculated according to the Marxist concept of national income, which excludes many so-called "non-productive services." However, the source (Report by Paul G. Hermberg) that provided the data on the formation of GNP also calculated the distribution of total availabilities (GNP minus net balance of trade and services) according to the 1952 plan, and FOA has made rough estimates of the distribution in fiscal years 1952/53 and 1953/54 (see Annex I, Table 4). According to the 1952 plan, personal consumption accounted for about one-half of total availabilities, which appeared to be its approximate proportion during the whole postwar period; gross public and private investment accounted for about one-fourth of total availabilities; defense expenditures accounted for about one-sixth and other government expenditures for the remainder. No major

Table IC-1: Formation of GNP 1947-1952

	<u>1947</u>	<u>1948</u>	<u>1949</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1951^d</u>	<u>1952^e</u>
Industry ^a /	37%	40%	45%	46%	43%	45%
Agriculture ^b /	34%	33%	32%	26%	31%	33%
Services ^c /	29%	27%	23%	28%	26%	22%
GNP	100	100	100	100	100	100
GNP (1947 = 100)	100	130	151	137	148	147

a. Includes mining, construction, and handicrafts.

b. Includes forestry.

c. Includes all services, those producing goods and those not producing goods according to Yugoslav terminology.

d. Based on plan data, it probably approximates actual figures, as 1951 plan was substantially fulfilled.

e. Based on plan data. It does not represent actual figures, as it is known that 1952 GNP was only about 90% of 1951 level due to drought.

Source: Report by Paul G. Hermberg, September 16, 1952, to FOA.

Table IC-2: Production of Selected Industrial Commodities, 1939-1952

	<u>1939</u>	<u>1946</u>	<u>1947</u>	<u>1948</u>	<u>1949</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1952</u>
Electric power (billions of Kwh)	1,100	1,144	1,456	2,007	2,186	2,408	2,550	2,700
Coal (ooo's of metric tons) ^{2/}	6,973	6,804	9,291	10,724	12,107	12,866	12,042	12,098
Pig iron (ooo's of metric tons)	101	84	162	172	190	212	248	273
Steel (ooo's of metric tons)	235	202	311	368	401	428	434	442
Refined copper (metric tons)	41,643	21,730	32,350	36,870	34,384	40,080	32,011	32,819
Electrolytic copper (metric tons)	12,463	12,925	14,078	14,441	14,162	14,676	14,004	21,390
Refined lead (metric tons)	10,651	32,591	40,402	49,214	56,760	57,204	60,068	67,180
Iron ore (ooo's metric tons)	667	395	733	864	825	826	581	676
Cement (ooo's of metric tons)	894	696	1,088	1,169	1,288	1,219	1,159	1,313

a Total of bituminous, brown coal and lignite, e.g., in 1952 total of 12,098,000 tons breaks down as follows:
 bituminous = 1,011,000; brown coal = 6,842,000; lignite = 4,245,000.

Source: Index Federal Statistical Office, No. 7, July 1953 (see also Annex 1, Table 5 for more detail).

Table IC-3: Production of Selected Products of Light Industry, 1939-1952

	<u>1939</u>	<u>1946</u>	<u>1947</u>	<u>1948</u>	<u>1949</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1952</u>
Cotton yarn (metric tons)	23,000	21,400	27,700	28,606	29,156	29,936	26,894	25,909
Cotton fabrics (ooo's of square meters)	n.a.	77,434	114,000	161,480	154,905	144,356	122,810	111,910
Wool fabrics (ooo's of square meters)	n.a.	15,700	21,800	26,037	27,941	24,434	23,330	19,983
Leather footwear (ooo's of pairs)	6,900	6,349	7,550	9,545	10,770	10,657	8,275	5,387 ^a
Rubber footwear (ooo's of pairs)	5,900	2,400	5,249	6,605	7,335	7,019	7,692	7,735
Sugar (ooo's of metric tons)	108	71	152	162	101	85	201	58
Soap, 60% fat content (metric tons)	11,668	13,113	15,369	12,349	12,542	14,588	16,743	21,224
Tobacco manufactures (metric tons)	10,794	9,638	12,141	16,896	20,836	19,270	14,146	12,571

a. Small local industry production not included.

Source: Indeks Federal Statistical Office No. 7, July 1953 and Annex I, Table 5.

Table IC-4: Production of Grains

(In 000's of metric tons)

	<u>1935-39</u> <u>Average</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1953</u>
Corn	4,469	2,084	4,033	1,470	4,033 ^{a/}
Wheat	2,633	1,827	2,277	1,677	2,500 ^{b/}
Rye	216	219	277	225	300 ^{b/}
Barley	405	266	358	257	370 ^{b/}

a. Yugoslav forecast; Embassy Belgrade estimate is 4,200,000 tons.
b. Rough estimates by Embassy Belgrade.

Sources: 1935-39 average - NIS 21-60, p. 3, CONFIDENTIAL; 1950 and 1951 D-377 Belgrade, November 18, 1952, CONFIDENTIAL, SECURITY INFORMATION; 1952 and 1953 - D-59 Belgrade, July 20, 1953, UNCLASSIFIED and D-185, Belgrade, August 28, 1953, RESTRICTED.

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Table IC-5: Yugoslav Balance of Payments Summary, 1946-1954

(In millions of US dollars)

	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	FY 1951/52	FY 1952/53	FY 1953/54
Summary									
Net Balance of Trade and Services	-212.1	-109.0	-57.5	-135.0	-119.4	-238.4	-88.0	-217.0	-84.0
Balancing Items									
1. Net Capital Balance (excl. Foreign Aid)	48.8	41.0	459.6	477.5	4127.2	486.9	-28.4	467.0	42.0
2. Foreign Aid	4220.0	463.0	44.6	45.9	48.6	4151.7	4127.5	4137.0	475.0
3. Use of Reserves (- build-up / drawing down)	-7.3	419.1	-2.6	445.6	-11.5	40.7	-13.0	413.0	47.0
4. Errors and Omissions	-9.4	-14.1	-4.1	46.0	-4.8	-0.9	41.9	--	--

Source: Annex 1, Table 6.

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changes in the distribution of Yugoslav GNP are expected in the near future. In fiscal year 1953/54, on the basis of very rough calculations, personal consumption is expected to be a slightly higher proportion of total availabilities than in 1951/52, investments about the same, and defense and other governmental expenditures slightly lower.

The above data bring out very clearly three of the problems that are faced by the Yugoslav economy. Annual personal consumption in Yugoslavia is only slightly higher than \$100 per capita, which is one of the lowest in all of Europe (see Section II-B). This condition is the result of the low level of Yugoslav GNP as compared to other European countries and the relatively small proportion of it devoted to personal consumption. If production is to increase, more incentives must be given to the workers either by raising the total product or by increasing the share of personal consumption or both. Closely connected to this are the other two problems, the share of total availabilities claimed by defense and by investment. The approximately 16 percent of total availabilities spent on the armed forces must be considered as a complete loss in strictly economic terms as it does nothing to increase production. The allocation of about one-fourth of total availabilities to investment cannot be placed in the same category as it does lead to greater production. The difficulty has been that despite the great investment, no corresponding increase in production has occurred as yet. As indicated in Section II-D, this is due to the construction of a large number of projects, many of which have not yet entered production during the period under discussion. A further important reason for the lag in industrial production since 1949

has been the serious balance of payments position of Yugoslavia, which made it difficult to import sufficient raw materials for Yugoslav industry.

2. Fluctuations in the Balance of Payments

There is a close interrelationship between the internal economic situation and Yugoslav foreign economic relations. As indicated above, the balance of payment problem prevented sufficient imports of raw materials for industry. At the same time, the lag in industrial production made it difficult to increase exports of industrial products, and by not making available adequate consumers' goods supplies as incentives for the peasants was one of the contributing causes of the lag in agricultural export availabilities. The lack of exportable supplies and the difficulty in developing foreign markets hindered the increase in Yugoslav exports while the needs of the investment program, the military establishment and industry kept imports at levels considerably higher than exports. (See Annex I, Tables 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 for statistical data on Yugoslav foreign trade.)

Table IC-5 summarizes the Yugoslav balance of payments position in the postwar period, and indicates the great fluctuations that occurred in the key item, the "net balance of trade and services." This item reflects the effects of various Yugoslav domestic policies, of the vagaries of weather, and ineffective government policies in regard to foreign trade. The most noticeable fact is that this item has been negative during the whole postwar period, indicating an excess of imports over exports in every one of the years. This should be compared

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to the prewar years when this item was usually positive with exports and receipts on services exceeding imports by an average of about \$20 million.

A study of the table shows that the largest deficits in the net balance of trade and services occurred in 1946, when postwar reconstruction was in full swing, in 1951 and fiscal year 1952/53, both years following a bad harvest. The size of the deficit also depended on the amount of foreign aid extended to Yugoslavia, as this aid enabled the Yugoslavs to import large quantities of goods without having to pay for them by their own exports.

A deficit in the balance of trade and services could not take place unless the imports were paid for in some manner, either by exports, aid, loans, or the drawing down of foreign exchange or gold holdings. Table IC-5 and Annex I, Table 6 show to what extent each of these means were employed to cover the deficit. Foreign economic aid was the most important balancing item in 1946, 1947, 1951, and later years, while the net capital balance was the most important in 1948, 1949, and 1950, i.e., after UNRRA relief stopped and before tripartite aid began. Foreign exchange and gold reserves were drawn down substantially in 1947, 1949, and in fiscal year 1952/53 but were somewhat built up in 1950 and fiscal year 1951/52. Fiscal year 1951/52 presents a very interesting case where a combination of an excellent harvest, a large amount of foreign aid, and some new loans enabled Yugoslavia to make substantial payments on existing loans, build up foreign exchange and gold reserves and still cover a deficit in the balance of trade and services. This is a unique case, however, as in every other year the utilization of new loans

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exceeded repayment of existing ones (see Section I-B above).

In balance of payment terms, the basic task facing Yugoslavia is to change the deficit in the balance of trade and services to a positive balance, as in the prewar period, by increasing exports and service receipts and/or decreasing imports in order to service existing debts, as well as to build up foreign exchange and gold reserves or, at least, avoid depleting them further. All this must presumably be done without having to depend on foreign aid.

Sections II and III deal with the various factors involved in solving the Yugoslav foreign economic problems. Section II discusses the sectors of the economy that would be affected by a withdrawal of economic aid, while Section III deals with government policies in selected fields and their effect on Yugoslavia's ability to cope with the problem. In Section IV an attempt will be made to draw some conclusions regarding the possibility of Yugoslavia's becoming independent of foreign economic aid in the near future and the changes that would have to take place in the Yugoslav economy to make it possible.

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ANNEX I--Table 1
Yugoslavia: Foreign Aid Programs, 1951-1954

	Cal. 1951	FY 1952	FY 1953	FY 1954
I. Tripartite Aid Program				
U.S. Pipeline, Beginning of Period				31.0
New Aid Allotment	0	26.7	22.4	45.0
Total Aid Available	61.50	80.25	121.75	76.0
Paid Shipments of Aid-Financed Imports	61.50	106.95	144.15	61.0
Pipeline, End of Period	49.08	84.55	113.15	15.0
	12.42	22.4	31.0	
U.K. Pipeline, Beginning of Period				1.3
New Aid Allotment	0	0	2.81	8.4
Total Aid Available	11.50	27.60	12.60	9.7
Paid Shipments of Aid-Financed Imports	11.50	27.60	15.41	8.4
Pipeline, End of Period	8.79	24.79	14.11	1.3
	2.71	2.81	1.3	
France Pipeline, Beginning of Period				2.6
New Aid Allotment	0	0	4.13	5.6
Total Aid Available	6.00	14.40	8.40	8.2
Paid Shipments of Aid-Financed Imports	6.00	14.40	12.53	5.6
Pipeline, End of Period	3.85	10.27	9.93	2.6
	2.15	4.13	2.6	
Total Pipeline, Beginning of Period				34.9
New Aid Allotment	0	26.7	29.34	59.0
Total Aid Available	79.00	122.25	142.75	93.9
Paid Shipments of Aid-Financed Imports	79.00	148.95	172.09	75.0
Pipeline, End of Period	61.72	119.65	137.19	18.9
	17.28	29.3	34.90	
Net Use of Pipeline*	-17.28	-8.2	-5.56	416.0
II. Total Foreign Aid Paid Shipments				
1. Tripartite Aid Program	61.72	119.65	137.19	75.0
2. U.S. Food Program	62.19	5.78	0	0
3. U.S. CARE Program	23.59	2.11	0	0
4. French Food Grant	0.95	0	0	0
5. Belgium Food Grant	0.16	0	0	0
Total	148.61	127.54	137.19	75.0

Source: Foreign Operations Agency

*Net of arrivals over new aid allotment (Depletion of pipeline shown as +; accretion to pipeline, as -). The difference between the date in this table and those in Table IA-1 is largely due to the inclusion of specific grants in the fiscal year in which they were actually made, rather than in the fiscal year in which they are likely to be used, as is the case in Table IA-1.

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ANNEX I--Table 2

Yugoslavia: Foreign Debt, Level and Payments, 1951-1959
(Millions of U.S. Dollars)

Types of Loans or Credit	Outstanding Jan. 1, 1951	Repaid Jan.-June 1951	Outstanding July 1, 1951	Repaid July-Dec. 1951	Outstanding Jan. 1, 1952	Repaid Jan.-June 1952	Outstanding July 1, 1952	Repaid July-Dec. 1952	Outstanding Jan. 1, 1953	Repaid Jan.-June 1953
A. Nationalized Property Debt	36.80	1.61	50.22	1.53	48.69	1.87	46.82	1.80	45.02	1.60
B. Prewar Public Debt to France	n.a.	0.19	n.a.	0.18	n.a.	0.50	n.a.	0.70	n.a.	0.40
C. Swings	53.75	6.46	54.14	17.19	37.82	8.89	36.30	6.70	44.91	5.16
D. Loans and Credits										
1. Austrian Investment Credit	10.00	0.00	10.00	0.00	10.00	0.00	10.00	0.00	10.00	1.50
2. Belgian Investment Credit	14.00	0.00	14.00	2.60	11.40	0.20	11.20	0.30	10.90	0.30
3. Belgian Commercial Credit	6.00	.64	5.36	.15	5.21	1.80	3.41	0.60	2.81	0.00
4. Belgian Cokeries	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
5. Egypt Cotton Advance	8.04	4.48	3.20	2.20	1.00	0.80	0.20	0.20	0.00	--
6. French Military Credit	--	--	--	--	2.19	0.00	5.83	0.60	10.00	0.10
7. German Medium-term Credit	35.00	0.00	35.00	0.00	35.00	0.10	43.90	1.50	42.40	1.30
8. German Short-term Credit	--	--	15.00	0.00	15.00	13.90	1.10	0.00	1.10	0.00
9. German Kolubara/Starnice Credit	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
10. IBRD Timber Loan	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.50	0.00	--	--	--	--	--
11. IBRD \$28 Million Loan	--	--	--	--	28.00	0.00	28.00	0.00	28.00	0.00
12. IBRD \$30 Million Loan	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
13. Netherlands (Ships)	2.63	0.00	2.63	1.32	1.31	1.20	0.00	--	--	--
14. Netherlands (Special)	--	--	--	--	1.53	0.00	1.58	0.00	1.58	0.20
15. Norwegian Food Credit	--	--	0.28	0.00	0.28	0.00	0.28	0.00	0.28	0.00
16. Swiss Credit	6.91	0.00	6.91	0.00	6.91	0.00	6.91	0.50	6.41	0.00
17. Swiss Credit	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
18. Turkish Wheat Credit	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
19. U.K. \$ 8 Million Credit	22.40	0.00	22.40	0.00	22.40	0.00	22.40	0.00	22.40	7.00
20. U.K. Timber Advance	2.56	2.71	0.25	0.25	0.00	--	--	--	--	0.00
21. U.K. \$ 3 Million Credit	8.40	0.00	8.40	0.00	8.40	0.00	8.40	0.00	8.40	0.00
22. U.K. \$ 2 Million Credit	--	--	5.60	0.00	5.60	0.00	5.60	0.00	5.60	0.00
23. U.K. \$ 4 Million Credit	--	--	11.20	0.00	11.20	0.00	11.20	0.00	11.20	0.00
24. U.S. Export-Import Bank	55.00	0.00	55.00	0.00	55.00	0.00	55.00	0.00	55.00	0.00
25. U.S. Chase National Bank Wheat Credit	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	8.00
26. Canadian Wheat Credit	172.84	8.83	195.73	7.02	220.48	18.00	214.81	3.70	254.08	3.40
Total										21.80

ANNEX I--Table 2 (cont.)

Yugoslavia: Foreign Debt, Level and Payments, 1951-1959
(Millions of U.S. Dollars)

Types of Loans or Credit	1951				1952				1953			
	Outstanding Jan. 1, 1951	Repaid Jan.-June 1951	Outstanding July 1, 1951	Repaid July-Dec. 1951	Outstanding Jan. 1, 1952	Repaid Jan.-June 1952	Outstanding July 1, 1952	Repaid July-Dec. 1952	Outstanding Jan. 1, 1953	Repaid Jan.-June 1953	Outstanding July 1, 1953	Repaid July-Dec. 1953
1. Revolving or Secured Credits												
a. B.I.S. (Secured)	3.50	0.00	3.50	0.00	5.50	4.05	1.45	0.00	7.25	0.00	0.00	0.00
2. IMF (Secured)	9.00	0.00	9.00	0.00	9.00	0.00	9.00	0.00	9.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
3. U.K. Revolving Credits												
a. Banks	4.00	0.26	10.52	0.00	10.52	.58	9.94	--	9.94	--	--	--
b. Exporters	3.78	3.02	2.34	2.32	2.20	1.32	1.40	0.00	2.78	--	--	--
4. U.S. Chase Bank	--	--	1.71	1.82	1.93	1.93	0.00	--	--	--	--	--
5. Sweden	--	--	--	--	0.40	--	0.40	--	0.60	--	--	--
Total	20.28	3.28	27.07	4.14	29.55	7.88	22.19	0.00	29.55	0.00	0.00	0.00
6. Total Indebtedness	283.67		327.15		336.54		320.12		373.56			
7. Principal Payments (Total)		20.37		29.89		37.14		12.90			28.96	
8. Interest Payments (Total)		1.86		2.40		1.70		2.60			3.00	

ANNEX 1--Table 2 (cont.)

Yugoslavia: Foreign Debt, Level and Payments, 1951-1959
(Millions of U.S. Dollars)

Types of Loans or Credit	1953		1954		1954		1954		1955		1955	
	Outstanding July-Dec.	Repaid July-Dec.	Outstanding Jan. 1,	Repaid Jan.-June	Outstanding July 1,	Repaid July-Dec.	Outstanding Jan. 1,	Repaid Jan.-June	Outstanding July 1,	Repaid July-Dec.	Outstanding Jan. 1,	Repaid Jan.-June
Nationalized Property Debt	43.42	1.79	41.63	1.83	39.70	2.35	37.35	2.41	34.94	2.38		
Prewar Public Debt to France	n.a.	0.48	n.a.	0.47	n.a.	0.50	n.a.	0.50	n.a.	0.50		
Swings	39.75	5.50	40.12	4.00	39.62	6.62	33.00	6.00	27.00	6.00		
Loans and Credits												
1. Austrian Investment Credit	8.50	2.00	6.50	1.60	4.90	1.60	3.30	1.60	1.70	1.60		
2. Belgian Investment Credit	10.50	0.20	10.40	0.30	10.10	2.40	7.70	1.40	6.30	1.40		
3. Belgian Commercial Credit	2.81	0.00	2.81	0.00	2.81	2.81	--	--	--	--		
4. Belgian Cokeries	3.20	0.00	3.20	0.00	3.20	0.40	2.80	0.40	2.40	0.40		
5. Egypt Cotton Advance	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
6. French Military Credit	10.70	0.30	10.40	0.30	10.10	0.60	9.50	1.40	8.10	2.10		
7. German Medium-term Credit	41.10	1.30	39.80	9.60	30.20	10.00	20.20	12.00	8.20	8.20		
8. German Short-term Credit	1.10	0.00	1.10	1.10	--	--	--	--	--	--		
9. German Kolubara/Stranice Credit	5.20	0.00	5.20	0.00	5.20	1.60	3.60	0.60	3.00	0.00		
10. IERD Timber Loan	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
11. IERD \$28 Million Loan	28.00	0.00	28.00	0.00	28.00	0.00	28.00	0.40	27.60	0.40		
12. IERD \$30 Million Loan	30.00	0.00	30.00	0.00	30.00	0.00	30.00	0.00	30.00	0.00		
13. Netherlands (Ships)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
14. Netherlands (Special)	1.38	0.53	0.85	0.53	0.32	0.32	0.00	--	--	--		
15. Norwegian Food Credit	0.56	0.07	0.49	0.00	0.49	0.07	0.42	0.07	0.35	0.07		
16. Swiss Credit	6.41	0.60	5.81	0.60	5.21	0.60	4.61	0.60	4.01	0.60		
17. Swiss Credit	6.00	0.00	6.00	0.00	6.00	0.00	6.00	0.00	6.00	0.00		
18. Turkish Wheat Credit	11.00	6.00	5.00	5.00	0.00	--	--	--	--	--		
19. U.K. £ 8 Million Credit	22.40	0.00	22.40	2.80	19.60	5.60	14.00	5.60	8.40	5.60		
20. U.K. Timber Advance	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
21. U.K. £ 3 Million Credit	8.40	0.00	8.40	0.00	8.40	0.00	8.40	0.00	8.40	0.00		
22. U.K. £ 2 Million Credit	5.60	0.00	5.60	0.00	5.60	0.00	5.60	0.00	5.60	0.00		
23. U.K. £ 4 Million Credit	11.20	0.00	11.20	0.00	11.20	0.00	11.20	0.00	11.20	0.00		
24. U.S. Export-Import Bank	55.00	0.00	55.00	0.00	55.00	1.25	53.75	1.25	52.50	1.25		
25. U.S. Chase National Bank Wheat Credit	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
26. Canadian Wheat Credit	8.60	8.60	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--		
27. Danish Food Credit	0.30	--	0.30	--	0.30	--	0.30	0.30	--	--		
Total	278.06	19.60	258.46	21.83	236.63	27.25	209.38	25.42	192.72	21.22		

ANNEX I--Table 2 (cont.)

Yugoslavia: Foreign Debt, Level and Payments, 1951-1959
(Millions of U.S. Dollars)

Types of Loans or Credit	1956				1957		1958		Outstanding Jan. 1, 1959
	Outstanding Jan. 1, 1956	Repaid Jan.-June 1956	Outstanding July-Dec. 1956	Repaid July-Dec. 1956	Outstanding Jan. 1, 1957	Repaid 1957	Outstanding Jan. 1, 1958	Repaid 1958	
Revolving Credits									
1. BIS	0.00	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
2. IMF	--	0.00	--	--	0.00	--	--	--	--
3. U.K. Revolving	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
a. Banks	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
b. Exporters	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
4. U.S. Chase Bank	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
5. Sweden	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Total	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Total Indebtedness	215.70		194.38		174.72		144.02		108.36
Principal Payments (Total)		21.82		20.16		31.70		36.66	
Interest Payments (Total)		4.50		4.00		8.00		7.00	

ANNEX I--Table 2 (cont.)

Yugoslavia: Foreign Debt, Level and Payments, 1951-1959
(Millions of U.S. Dollars)

Types of Loans or Credit	Outstanding Jan. 1, 1956		Repaid Jan.-June 1956		Outstanding July 1, 1956		Repaid July-Dec. 1956		Outstanding Jan. 1, 1957		Repaid 1957		Outstanding Jan. 1, 1958		Repaid 1958		Outstanding Jan. 1, 1959	
	32.56	2.40	2.40	30.16	2.40	27.76	4.28	23.48	13.37	10.11	13.37	10.11	13.37	10.11	13.37	10.11	13.37	10.11
Nationalized Property																		
Prewar Public Debt to France	n.a.	0.50	0.50	n.a.	0.50	n.a.	1.00	n.a.	1.00	n.a.	1.00	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1.00	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Swings	21.00	6.00	6.00	15.00	5.00	10.00	5.00	5.00	5.00	0.00	5.00	0.00	5.00	0.00	5.00	0.00	5.00	0.00
Loans and Credits																		
1. Austrian Investment Credit	.10	.10	.10															
2. Belgian Investment Credit	4.90	1.40	1.40	3.50	1.40	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.10
3. Belgian Commercial Credit	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
4. Belgian Cokeries	2.00	0.40	0.40	1.60	0.40	1.20	0.80	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.40
5. Egypt Cotton Advance	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
6. French Military Credit	6.00	2.10	2.10	3.90	1.60	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30
7. German Medium-term Credit	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
8. German Short-term Credit	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
9. German Kolubara/Strnisee Credit	3.00	0.60	0.60	2.40	0.00	2.40	0.60	1.80	0.60	1.20	0.60	1.20	0.60	1.20	0.60	1.20	0.60	1.20
10. IBRD Timber Loan	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
11. IBRD \$28 Million Loan	27.20	0.40	0.40	26.80	0.40	26.40	0.80	25.60	0.80	24.80	0.80	24.00	0.80	23.20	0.80	22.40	0.80	21.60
12. IBRD \$30 Million Loan	30.00	0.00	0.00	30.00	0.40	29.60	0.80	28.80	0.80	28.00	0.80	27.20	0.80	26.40	0.80	25.60	0.80	24.80
13. Netherlands (Ships)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
14. Netherlands (Special)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
15. Norwegian Food Credit	0.28	0.00	0.00	0.28	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14
16. Swiss Credit	3.41	0.60	0.60	2.81	0.60	2.21	1.20	1.01	1.01	0.00	1.01	0.00	1.01	0.00	1.01	0.00	1.01	0.00
17. Swiss Credit	6.00	0.50	0.50	5.50	0.50	5.00	1.00	4.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.00
18. Turkish Wheat Credit	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
19. U.K. \$ 8 Million Credit	2.80	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.40	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
20. U.K. Timber Advance	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
21. U.K. \$ 3 Million Credit	8.40	1.40	1.40	7.00	1.40	5.60	2.80	2.80	2.80	2.80	2.80	2.80	2.80	2.80	2.80	2.80	2.80	2.80
22. U.K. \$ 2 Million Credit	5.60	0.84	0.84	4.76	0.84	3.92	1.96	1.96	1.96	1.96	1.96	1.96	1.96	1.96	1.96	1.96	1.96	1.96
23. U.K. \$ 4 Million Credit	11.20	1.68	1.68	9.52	1.68	7.84	3.92	3.92	3.92	3.92	3.92	3.92	3.92	3.92	3.92	3.92	3.92	3.92
24. U.S. Export-Import Bank	51.25	1.50	1.50	49.75	1.50	48.25	3.00	45.25	3.00	42.25	3.00	39.25	3.00	36.25	3.00	33.25	3.00	30.25
25. U.S. Chase National Bank Wheat Credit	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
26. Canadian Wheat Credit	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Total	162.14	12.92	12.92	149.22	12.26	136.96	21.42	115.54	17.29	98.25	17.29	80.96	17.29	63.67	17.29	46.38	17.29	29.09

ANNEX I--Table 2 (cont.)

Yugoslavia: Foreign Debt, Level and Payments, 1951-1959
(Millions of U.S. Dollars)

Types of Loans or Credit	1953		1954		1954		1954		1955		1955	
	Outstanding July-Deo.	Repaid July-Deo.	Outstanding Jan. 1, 1954	Repaid Jan.-June 1954	Outstanding July 1, 1954	Repaid July-Deo. 1954	Outstanding Jan. 1, 1955	Repaid Jan.-June 1955	Outstanding July 1, 1955	Repaid July-Deo. 1955	Outstanding Jan. 1, 1956	Repaid Jan.-June 1956
a. Revolving Credits												
1. BIS	7.25	0.00	7.25	0.00	7.25	3.25	4.00	2.00	2.00	2.00		
2. IMF	9.00	--	9.00	4.50	4.50	4.50	--	--	--	--		
3. U.K. Revolving												
a. Banks	11.00	2.78	8.22	8.22	--	--	--	--	--	--		
b. Exporters	2.76	0.00	2.76	0.00	2.76	--	2.76	2.76	--	--		
4. U.S. Chase Bank	3.00	3.00	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.00	--		
5. Sweden	0.60	0.00	0.60	0.00	0.60	0.00	0.60	0.60	0.00	--		
Total	33.61	5.78	27.83	12.72	15.11	7.75	7.36	5.36	2.00	2.00		
b. Total Indebtedness	394.84		368.04		331.06		287.09		247.70			
c. Principal Payments (Total)		33.15		40.95		44.47		39.89		32.50		
d. Interest Payments (Total)		4.30		4.30		4.50		4.50		4.50		

ANNEX I--Table 3

Contractions of Yugoslav Foreign Debt
 (In millions of US dollars)

	1950		1951		1952		1953
	Pre-1950	Jan-June July-Dec	Jan-June July-Dec	Jan-June July-Dec	Jan-June July-Dec	Jan-June July-Dec	Jan-June
<u>Nationalized Property Debts</u>							
Belgium	7.30						
Denmark		0.20		15.00			
France							
Israel a/				0.03			
Norway							
Sweden	8.33						
Switzerland	17.20						
United Kingdom	12.60						
<u>Total</u>	45.43	0.20	15.03				
<u>Prewar Public Debts b/</u>							
<u>Loans and Credits</u>							
<u>Austrian Investment Cr.</u>							
Belgian Investment		10.00					3.20
Belgian Commercial		14.00					
Belgian Cokeries		6.00					
Egypt-Cotton Advance							
French Military					5.63	4.97	
German Medium-Term		35.00		2.19	9.00		
German Short-Term			15.00				5.20
German Kolubara-Stroisce							
IBRD Timber	2.70			28.00			30.00
IBRD #1							
IBRD #2							
Netherlands--Ship.			2.63				
Netherlands--Special Cr.				1.58			0.28
Norwegian--Food							
Swiss Credit #1	4.61		2.30	0.28			6.00
Swiss Credit #2							
Turkish Wheat Credit							
United Kingdom 18m	22.40					18.00	
United Kingdom Timber Adv.			5.60				

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ANNEX I--Table 3 (cont.)

	1950		1951		1952		1953	
	Pre-1950	Jan-June July-Dec	Jan-June July-Dec	Jan-June July-Dec	Jan-June July-Dec	Jan-June July-Dec	Jan-June July-Dec	Jan-June July-Dec
Nationalized Property Debts								
Cont.								
United Kingdom \$ 3m		8.40						
" " " 2m			5.60					
" " " 4m			11.20					
United States Exim. Bank	20.00	20.00	15.00					
" " Chase--Wheat						8.00		
Canada--Wheat						12.00		
Danish Food Credit								
Total	49.71	38.57	88.40	31.77	14.63	42.97	0.30	44.98
Revolving and Secured Credits								
BIS		5.50						
IMF	9.00					7.25		
UK: Banks	11.20							
Exports	2.80							
US--Chase Bank			5.00					
Sweden				0.40		0.20		
Total	23.00	5.50	5.00	0.40	0	7.45	0	
Summary								
Nationalized Property Debts	45.43	0	0.20	0	0	0	0	
Loans and Credits	49.71	38.57	88.40	31.77	14.63	42.97	44.98	
Revolving and Secured Credits	23.00	5.50	5.00	0.40	0	7.45	0	
TOTAL	118.14	44.07	88.60	32.17	14.63	50.42	44.98	
Swing Credits	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.87	7.37	15.31	--	
Total Debt			58.96	33.04	22.00	65.73	44.98	

a/ Date of signature of agreement not known, total amount depends on rate of Jewish emigration from Yugoslavia to Israel.

b/ Various agreements regarding the prewar public debt were signed in 1950 and 1951. Total amounts agreed upon are not known.

ANNEX I--Table 4

Yugoslavia: Internal Accounts
 (In thousands of US dollars)

	<u>FY 1951/52 a/</u>	<u>FY 1952/53 a/</u>	<u>FY 1953/54 a/</u>
A. National Accounts			
1. Gross National Product (at market prices)	3,730	3,305	3,810
a. Index of GNP per man year (1951/52 = 100) (1 ÷ 8a ÷ Base Year)	100.0	89.6	101.0
2. Net balance of trade and services in all currencies b/	-88	-219	-85
3. Total availabilities (1 - 2) or (4 ÷ 5 ÷ 6)	3,818	3,524	3,895
4. Personal Consumption	1,880	1,698	2,043
a. As % of total availabilities	49.2	51.4	52.5
b. Per capita consumption (dollars)	112.6	100.5	118.8
c. Index of per capita consumption (1951/52 = 100)	100.0	89.3	105.5
5. Public and Private Investment (Gross)	906	840	942
a. As % of total availabilities	23.7	25.4	24.2
6. Total Government Services	1,032	986	910
a. Non-defense	408	386	310
b. Defense	624	600	600
(1) As % of total availabilities	16.3	17.0	15.4
B. Population and Employment			
7. Population (as of middle of fiscal year) (millions)	16.7	16.9	17.2
8. Civilian Labor Force (millions)	9.2	9.2	9.3
a. Employed	9.2	9.1	9.3
b. Unemployed	--	0.1	--
(1) As % of civilian labor force	--	1.1	--

Source: Foreign Operations Administration

a/ GNP and its components were estimated on basis of calendar year Social Plans:
 FY 1951/52 on basis of 1952 Social Plan, FY 1952/53 on basis of 1953 Social Plan,
 1953/54 FOA estimate.

b/ Net balance for trade and services is on fiscal year basis.

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ANNEX I--Table 5

STATISTICS OF MINING, INDUSTRY, AND TRANSPORTATION

Table 5a. Mining Production, 1939-1952

	Unit	1939	1946	1948	1950	1951	1952b/ Original c/	1951 Plan	
								Revised d/	
Coal Output									
Bituminous	Mill. M. Tons	1.4	0.8	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.0	n.a.	n.a.
Brown Coal	Mill. M. Tons	4.3	3.8	6.3	7.2	6.9	6.8	n.a.	n.a.
Lignite	Mill. M. Tons	1.3	2.2	3.4	4.5	4.1	4.3	n.a.	n.a.
Total, all types	Mill. M. Tons	7.0	6.8	10.7	12.9	12.0	12.1	16.5	14.9
Crude Oil Output	Thous. M. Tons	1.1	28.8	36.5	111.3	155.6	151.5	450.0	140.0
Metal Ores									
Iron Ore	Thous. M. Tons	666.8	394.6	864.5	825.9	581.4	676.0	1500.0	800.0
Copper Ore	Thous. M. Tons	983.9	645.8	1049.7	1115.8	1173.2	1265.0	n.a.	1200.0
Lead-Zinc Ore	Thous. M. Tons	755.6	617.7	850.7	1186.7	1188.6	1203.8	n.a.	1364.0
Bauxite	Thous. M. Tons	718.6	55.2	136.5	200.9	453.4	577.2	n.a.	n.a.
Manganese Ore	Thous. M. Tons	5.7	7.5	12.8	13.3	12.9	12.7	n.a.	n.a.
Chrome Ore	Thous. M. Tons	44.9	93.7	62.6	114.7	99.6	107.2	n.a.	100.0
Antimony Ore	Thous. M. Tons	19.0	30.5	34.7	80.5	55.1	74.6	n.a.	n.a.
Pyrite Ore	Thous. M. Tons	128.0	48.6	90.7	30.9	40.2	20.7	n.a.	n.a.
Pyrite Concentrates	Thous. M. Tons	78.1	n.a.	175.9	86.2	113.5	167.4	n.a.	n.a.

Table 5b. Production of Heavy Industry, 1939-1952

1951 Plan								
Unit		1939	1946	1948	1950	1951	1952b/ Original c/	Revised d/
A. Power and Fuels								
Electric Power	Bill. Kwh.	1.1	1.1	2.0	2.4	2.5	2.7	3.0
of which:								
Thermal	Bill. Kwh.	0.6	0.6	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.3	n.a.
Hydro	Bill. Kwh.	0.5	0.5	1.0	1.2	1.3	1.4	n.a.
Coal, all types	Mill. M. Tons	7.0	6.8	10.7	12.9	12.0	12.1	14.9
Crude Oil	Thous. M. Tons	1.1	28.8	36.5	111.3	155.6	151.5	140.0
Petroleum Products	Thous. M. Tons	97.4	21.3	133.7	475.0	503.6	516.7	n.a.
B. Metallurgical Industry								
Ferrous Metallurgy								
Pig Iron	Thous. M. Tons	101	84	172	212	248	273	262
Crude Steel	Thous. M. Tons	235	202	368	428	434	442	468
Rolled Products	Thous. M. Tons	151	112	247	278	301	293	n.a.
Drawn Products	Thous. M. Tons	2.5	0.2	11.4	11.9	13.6	11.8	n.a.
Nonferrous Metallurgy								
Copper, Blister	Thous. M. Tons	41.6	21.7	36.9	40.1	32.0	32.8	37.0
Copper, Electrolytic	Thous. M. Tons	12.5	12.9	14.4	14.7	14.0	21.4	n.a.
Lead, Refined	Thous. M. Tons	10.6	32.6	49.2	57.2	60.1	67.2	77.0
Zinc, Refined	Thous. M. Tons	4.2	3.2	6.4	10.8	13.2	14.5	13.1
Antimony, Regulus	Thous. M. Tons	1.5	1.2	1.5	1.8	1.2	1.3	1.5
Aluminum	Thous. M. Tons	1.7	0.6	1.9	1.9	2.8	2.6	2.8
Mercury	Thous. M. Tons	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	n.a.
Bismuth	M. Tons	n.a.	n.a.	51.0	60.5	87.8	98.7	n.a.
Silver	M. Tons	1.0	n.a.	46.8	74.2	94.3	80.2	n.a.

Table 5b. Production of Heavy Industry, 1939-1952 (cont.)

1951 Plan								
<u>Original c/ Revised d/</u>								
<u>Unit</u>	<u>1939</u>	<u>1946</u>	<u>1948</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1952b/</u>	<u>Original c/</u>	<u>Revised d/</u>
<u>Metal Working and Engineering</u>								
<u>Foundry Production</u>								
Steel Castings								
Thous. M. Tons	n.a.	n.a.	6.2	8.2	9.2	10.5	n.a.	n.a.
Iron Castings								
Thous. M. Tons	n.a.	n.a.	49.1	69.2	66.4	54.6	n.a.	n.a.
<u>Machinery and Equipment</u>								
Metalworking Machinery								
Thous. M. Tons	0.1	n.a.	0.6	1.6	1.3	2.0	n.a.	n.a.
Construction Machinery								
Thous. M. Tons	0.05	0.1	1.3	1.3	1.7	1.0	7.6	n.a.
Boilers								
Thous. M. Tons	0.1	0.6	1.9	4.3	3.0	2.4	n.a.	n.a.
Turbines								
Thous. M. Tons	0	0	0.2	0.2	0.2	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Railroad Freight Cars								
Units	26	10	87	56	28	n.a.	5500 g/	n.a.
Trucks								
Units	0	0	472	826	803	699	n.a.	n.a.
Tractors								
Units	0	0	0	53	840	n.a.	1500	n.a.
Agricultural Machines								
Thous. M. Tons	3.2	1.8	7.6	10.7	11.5	9.7	34.0	n.a.
Roller Bearings								
M. Tons	0	0	0	30	49	87	n.a.	n.a.
<u>Electrical Equipment</u>								
Rotary Machines								
Thous. K.W.	4.3	8.4	79.8	106.1	118.2	259.5	135.0	n.a.
Rotary Machines								
Thous. Units	n.a.	3.2	17.1	26.1	34.8	47.7	n.a.	n.a.
Transformers, 3-phase								
Thous. K.V.A.	n.a.	3.8	77.1	114.5	297.7	411.1	360.0	n.a.
Transformers, 3-phase								
Thous. Units	n.a.	0.1	0.8	0.4	1.0	0.9	n.a.	n.a.
Dynamo Wire								
M. Tons	n.a.	84	405	501	467	530	n.a.	n.a.
Electric Cables								
Thous. M. Tons	n.a.	3.2	5.9	6.4	6.3	4.8	10.0	n.a.
Measuring Instruments								
Thous. Units	n.a.	0	30.7	72.2	58.0	104.9	n.a.	n.a.

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Table 5b. Production of Heavy Industry, 1939-1952 (cont.)

	Unit	1939	1946	1948	1950	1951	1952b/ Original c/ Revised d/	1951 Plan
Chemicals								
Sulfuric Acid	Thous. M. Tons	14.1	26.1	45.5	40.4	40.9	32.3	n.a.
Hydrochloric Acid	Thous. M. Tons	n.a.	0.8	3.8	3.9	3.9	4.0	n.a.
Calcined Soda	Thous. M. Tons	22.0	20.7	35.1	31.9	30.5	33.0	n.a.
Caustic Soda	Thous. M. Tons	14.5	6.0	18.6	18.6	19.1	20.4	n.a.
Calcium Carbide	Thous. M. Tons	63.6	15.5	41.1	40.6	37.8	39.7	n.a.
Copper Sulfate	Thous. M. Tons	12.8	12.5	20.3	13.7	17.0	14.4	n.a.
Chemical Fertilizers	Thous. M. Tons	72.8	51.9	79.6	66.5	58.7	69.7	62.0
Plastics	Thous. M. Tons	0	0	0	0	1.6	2.8	n.a.
Synthetic Rubber	Thous. M. Tons	0	0	0	0	0	0	n.a.
Building Materials, etc.								
Cement	Mill. M. Tons	0.9	0.4	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.5
Plate Glass	Mill. M ²	1.7	1.7	2.5	2.2	3.8	3.4	n.a.
Other Glass	Thous. M. Tons	12.0	11.0	17.3	17.4	19.4	20.3	n.a.
Magnesite Crude	Thous. M. Tons	24.2	12.6	51.7	59.3	89.9	37.8	n.a.
Asbestos Fiber	Thous. M. Tons	0	0	2.9	1.0	1.5	2.5	n.a.
Electro-Porcelain	Thous. M. Tons	0.3	n.a.	0.5	0.9	1.2	1.0	n.a.
Bricks	Mill. Units	639	274	665	904	526	550	1376
Tiles	Mill. Units	192	147	248	243	191	190	586
Timber and Paper								
Sawn Timber	Mill. M ³	n.a.	1.0	3.1	3.0	2.3	2.1	3.4
Veneers & Boards	Thous. M ³	n.a.	n.a.	26.7	28.9	28.2	27.7	n.a.
of which:								
Veneered Panels	Thous. M ³	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	6.6	6.2	n.a.
Plywood	Thous. M ³	18.5e/	n.a.	15.3	14.0	13.9	14.9	48.4
Other	Thous. M ³	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	7.7	6.6	n.a.
Insulating Boards	Thous. M ²	n.a.	n.a.	660	795	918	668	n.a.
Wood Pulp	Thous. M. Tons	5.6	7.4	13.7	19.2	21.0	15.0	63.0
Cellulose	Thous. M. Tons	35.6	12.3	22.1	26.5	31.5	34.2	87.0
Cardboard & Paper	Thous. M. Tons	50.2	32.3	55.2	57.1	55.9	49.2	145.0

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Table 5c. Production of Light Industry, 1939-1952

		1951 Plan						
		1952b/ Original c/					Revised d/	
Unit		1939	1946	1948	1950	1951	1952b/	
Durable Consumer Goods								
Metal Furniture	Thous. M. Tons	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	3.0	4.0	
Kitchen Utensils	Thous. M. Tons	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	7.2	6.5	5.6	
Radio Sets	Thous. Units	0	0	23.1	26.0	25.5	26.3	
Light Bulbs	Mill. Units	1.2	1.2	4.4	3.8	4.7	5.6	
Textiles, Leather, Rubber								
Cotton Yarn	Thous. M. Tons	23.0	21.4	28.6	29.9	26.9	25.9	
Woolen Yarn	Thous. M. Tons	6.0	6.7	13.0	13.1	13.1	10.3	
Cotton Fabric	Mill. M ²	n.a.	77.4	161.5	144.4	122.8	111.9	
Woolen Fabric	Mill. M ²	n.a.	15.7	26.0	24.4	23.3	20.0	
Artificial Silk	Mill. M ²	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	4.2	6.8	
Sole Leather	Thous. M. Tons	7.6	4.8	10.4	11.6	10.3	8.2	
Upper Leather	Mill. M ²	2.0	1.9	2.5	2.8	2.6	2.3	
Footwear, Total	Mill. Pairs	12.8	8.7e/	16.1	17.7	16.0	13.1	
of which:								
Leather	Mill. Pairs	6.9	6.3	9.5	10.7	8.3	5.4	
Rubber	Mill. Pairs	5.9	2.4e/	6.6	7.0	7.7	7.7	
Tires, Motor Vehicle	Thous. Units	7.9	4.1	35.8	53.6	63.0	55.2	
Tires, Bicycle	Thous. Units	276.0	157.0	580.0	677.0	188.5	106.0	
Food, Tobacco, etc.								
Sugar, Refined	Thous. M. Tons	107.6	70.7	162.4	84.9	201.1	57.6	
Starches	Thous. M. Tons	n.a.	n.a.	7.6	9.4	9.4	9.4	
Edible Oil	Thous. M. Tons	24.4	n.a.	n.a.	25.0	20.1	19.2	
Beer	Mill. Hectoliters	0.4	0.6	1.2	1.1	1.2	0.9	
Fermented Tobacco	Thous. M. Tons	16.5	n.a.	39.0	21.3	15.4	24.4	
Tobacco Products	Thous. M. Tons	10.8	9.6	16.9	19.3	14.1	12.6	
Soap (60% Fat)	Thous. M. Tons	11.7	13.1	12.3	14.6	16.7	21.2	

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Table 5d. Transportation and Communications, 1939-1952

1951 Plan									
Unit		1939	1946	1948	1950	1951	1952b/	Original c/	Revised d/
<u>Railways</u>									
Passengers Carried	Mill.	58.3	78.4	136.4	179.0	169.5	104.3	90.0	n.a.
Freight Carried	Mill. M. Tons	21.1	19.5	36.2	46.1	41.9	37.9	53.2	n.a.
Freight Turnover	Bill. Ton/KM.	4.8	3.5	7.4	9.9	8.7	8.4	10.5	n.a.
<u>Maritime Transport</u>									
Passengers Carried	Mill.	n.a.	n.a.	4.0	3.6	2.9	2.1	n.a.	n.a.
Freight Carried	Mill. M. Tons	3.3e/	n.a.	1.9	2.5	2.8	3.1	6.2	n.a.
Freight Turnover	Bill. Ton/Miles	10.1e/	n.a.	3.3	4.2	6.1	6.6	16.0	n.a.
<u>River Transport</u>									
Passengers Carried	Mill.	n.a.	1.0	1.7	1.7	2.6	1.5	n.a.	n.a.
Freight Carried	Mill. M. Tons	3.1e/	1.3	2.6	3.1	3.4	3.4	3.5	n.a.
Freight Turnover	Mill. Ton/KM.	n.a.	241	537	471	578	631	n.a.	n.a.
<u>Air Transport</u>									
Passengers Carried	Thous.	12.7	10.1	27.7	66.6	86.7	61.3	160.0	n.a.
Freight Carried	M. Tons	185	101	293	669	801	605	n.a.	n.a.
<u>Communications</u>									
Letters Carried	Mill.	581.4	424.0	664.3	784.9	632.7	436.4)	650.0	n.a.
Parcels Carried	Mill.	5.3	3.0	6.7	8.0	6.5	4.0)		
Telegrams	Mill.	4.3	3.6	5.7	7.5	6.0	2.9	5.0	n.a.
Phone Calls	Mill.	164.5	124.3	240.3	268.1	247.7	203.7	n.a.	n.a.

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ANNEX I--Table 5

STATISTICS OF MINING, INDUSTRY, AND TRANSPORTATION

Footnotes

- a/ Except where otherwise noted, figures are from the following sources:
 1. 1939-1952--Indeks (Monthly Review of Yugoslav Economic Statistics), Belgrade, various issues, 1951-1953.
 2. 1951 Plan, original--Five Year Plan, Yugoslavia, Belgrade, 1947.
 3. 1951 Plan, revised--IBRD, Report on the Economy and Creditworthiness of Yugoslavia, October 1, 1951, RESTRICTED.
- b/ Production figures for the entire year 1952 are not yet available, but are expected to be before this report is finalized.
- c/ These are the goals originally set for 1951 in 1947, when the Yugoslav Five-Year Plan was inaugurated.
- d/ These represent revisions of the 1951 goals as reported to the IBRD in April, 1949.
- e/ Figures from Five-Year Plan, op. cit.
- f/ Five-Year Plan gives the 1951 goal as 250 million meters, but does not state it in terms of square meters. In the revised goals presented to the IBRD, the figure of 151 million is given, but it is not clear whether this refers to linear meters or square meters.
- g/ 1951 Plan given in 2 axle units.

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ANNEX I--Table 6
Yugoslav Balance of Payments and Foreign Aid
All-Currency Balance of Payments, 1946-1954
(In millions of US dollars)

	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1951/52	1952/53	1953/54
<u>Payments (-)</u>									
1. Imports (CIF) 1/	268.5	279.5	378.0	332.9	286.6	434.9	361.1	408.0	330.0
2. Net Balance for Services	0.6	2.2	1.0	--	--	--	--	--	--
3. Capital Payments	15.4	32.8	36.0	11.3	4.9	38.0	60.1	30.0	40.0
a. Payments Agreements (net)	15.4	--	--	--	--	16.9	19.8	--	--
b. Amortization and Repayments	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	--	3.0	1.5	40.3	30.0	40.0
c. Other Capital Payments	--	32.86/	36.0	11.37/	1.9	19.6	--	--	--
4. Building-up of Reserves (net) 2/	7.3	--	2.6	--	11.5	--	13.0	--	--
<u>Receipts (+)</u>									
1. Exports 3/	57.0	172.7	321.5	191.9	160.7	184.5	263.7	183.0	237.0
2. Net Balance for Services	--	--	--	6.0	6.5	12.0	9.4	8.0	9.0
3. Donations & Capital Receipts (excl. Foreign Aid)	24.4	73.8	95.6	88.8	132.1	124.9	31.7	97.0	42.0
a. Private Donations and Capital	15.6	28.3	19.7	19.6	26.8	29.5	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
b. Reparation Receipts	4.8	35.0	50.4	15.7	15.7	35.4	7.3	--	--
c. Payments Agreements (net)	--	10.5	10.5	19.1	22.9	--	--	7.0	--
d. Loans and Credits 4/	--	--	--	8.08/	51.9	45.8	24.4	90.0	42.0
e. Other Capital Receipts	3.8	--	15.0	26.48/	14.8	14.2	--	--	--
4. Foreign Aid 5/	220.0	63.0	4.6	5.9	8.6	151.7	127.5	137.0	75.0
5. Drawing Down of Reserves (net) 2/	--	19.1	--	45.6	--	0.7	--	13.0	7.0
Errors and Omissions	-9.4	-14.1	-4.1	+6.0	-4.8	-0.9	+1.9	--	--
<u>Summary</u>									
Net Balance of Trade and Services	-212.1	-109.0	-57.5	-135.0	-119.4	-238.4	-88.0	-217.0	-84.0
Balancing Items									
1. Net Capital Balance (excl. Foreign Aid)	+8.8	+41.0	+59.6	+77.5	+127.2	+86.9	-28.4	+67.0	+2.0
2. Foreign Aid	+220.0	+63.0	+4.6	+5.9	+8.6	+151.7	+127.5	+137.0	+75.0
3. Use of Reserves (- build-up + drawing down)	-7.3	+19.1	-2.6	+45.6	-11.5	+0.7	-13.0	+13.0	+7.0
4. Errors and Omissions	-9.4	-14.1	-4.1	+6.0	-4.8	-0.9	+1.9	--	--

ANNEX I--Table 6 (cont.)

Yugoslav Balance of Payments and Foreign Aid
All-Currency Balance of Payments, 1946-1954
(In millions of US dollars)

- 1/ Includes parcel post and relief shipments.
- 2/ Net sum of categories 14.4 (other short-term assets) and 15 (monetary gold) in IMF Balance of Payment Summary Tables.
- 3/ Includes \$1 million off-shore purchases in FY 1953/54.
- 4/ Utilization of loans and credits.
- 5/ Actual shipments allotments plus pipeline.
- 6/ Includes \$0.6 million gold subscription to IMF and IBRD.
- 7/ Includes \$7.9 million gold subscription to IMF and IBRD.
- 8/ Includes \$9.0 million use of IMF resources.

n.a. Not Available.
-- Negligible.

Sources: 1946-1949 Balance of Payments Yearbook, Vol. 4; 1950-1951 International Monetary Fund, Washington, 1952; 1950--IMF, Balance of Payments Division data correcting information contained in Balance of Payments Yearbook.
1951--Basic tables presented to the International Monetary Fund by the National Bank of Yugoslavia in a letter dated July 11, 1952.
Fiscal years 1951/52 to 1953/54--FOA estimates.

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ANNEX I--Table 7

Yugoslavia: Foreign Trade, 1939-1952

Year	IMPORTS		EXPORTS		Balance
	Thousands of Metric Tons	Millions of Dollars	Thousands of Metric Tons	Millions of Dollars	
1939	1,126	107.9	3,464	125.3	+17.4
1940-45	---	---	---	---	---
1946	---	34.8	502	55.7	+20.9
1947	955	165.4	2,367	172.8	+7.4
1948	1,473	315.6	4,174	302.2	-13.4
1949	1,516	291.5	3,593	192.3	-99.2
1950	1,630	235.8	3,082	158.6	-77.2
1951	a/ 2,060	a/ 390.8	3,228	183.6	-207.2
1952	b/ 2,089	b/ 369.4	3,479	244.1	-125.2

Source: INDEX, Monthly Review of Yugoslav Federal Statistical Office.

Millions of dinars converted to millions of U.S. dollars at the following rates:

1939--\$0.0227; 1946-1951--\$0.02; 1952--\$0.0033.

a/ Includes economic aid and food aid--1,038 thousands of metric tons valued at 148.6 millions of dollars.

b/ Includes economic aid--991 thousands of metric tons valued at 100.6 millions of dollars.

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ANNEX I--Table 8

Yugoslavia: Imports by Commodities, 1950-1952

Commodity	Quantity in Metric Tons			Value in Thousands of Dollars*		
	1950	1951	1952	1950	1951	1952
Vegetable Products	37,012	345,010	475,397	5,757	39,335	54,100
Livestock and Animal Products	1,795	30,460	1,390	260	28,772	435
Vegetable and Animal Oils and Fats	18,522	79,867	46,672	6,886	36,803	16,220
Food Industry Products	16,768	163,467	112,186	2,940	23,742	16,037
Wood, Cork and Wicker Products	87	478	528	35	195	291
Leather, Furs and Manufactures	14,467	11,160	8,124	9,244	9,262	4,264
Textiles	51,988	49,146	43,322	59,346	72,283	48,343
Chemical and Pharmaceutical Products	63,889	93,539	65,591	11,824	18,699	14,689
Rubber and Manufactures	8,165	9,887	8,196	5,971	12,362	9,283
Cellulose, Cardboard and Paper	28,379	17,336	18,563	4,995	5,327	4,303
Fuel, Lubricants, Bitumens	897,229	986,589	958,061	21,629	29,584	28,617
Non-metallic Minerals and Manufactures	164,205	74,625	90,851	7,393	4,149	8,220
Ores, Metals and Manufactures	241,700	111,443	165,394	33,220	23,782	42,387
Vehicles	45,789	41,757	21,561	21,326	23,620	23,008
Machinery and Equipment	29,226	36,511	59,579	28,243	41,641	64,468
Electric Machinery and Appliances	10,262	8,233	14,284	13,805	17,230	25,965
Instruments and Apparatus	351	405	554	2,311	3,045	4,445
Printed Matter, Films and Fancy Articles	51	117	213	610	975	977
Total Including Aid	1,629,885	2,060,030	2,089,466	235,795	390,807	369,352 a/
Regular Imports	1,629,885	1,022,003	1,098,250	235,795	242,206	268,727
Economic Aid and Food	--	1,038,027	991,216	--	148,601	100,625

a/ The individual categories add up to only \$366,052,000. There may be a typographical error in source.

*Converted from thousands of dinars to thousands of dollars at the following rates: 1950-1951, \$0.02; 1952, \$0.0033.

Source: Yugoslav Federal Statistical Office. Statistics of Foreign Trade of the FPR of Yugoslavia, 1951 and 1952.

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ANNEX I-Table 9

Yugoslavia: Exports by Commodities, 1950-1952

Commodity	Quantity in Metric Tons		Value in Thousands of Dollars*	
	1950	1951	1950	1951
Vegetable Products				
Livestock and Animal Products				
Vegetable and Animal Oils and Fats	284,327	206,854	23,309	21,856
Food Industry Products	26,183	14,527	12,595	7,837
Wood, Cork and Wicker Products				
Leather, Furs and Manufactures	48,101	43,696	14,160	15,459
Textiles	1,300,893	1,080,218	51,873	55,876
Chemical and Pharmaceutical Products	1,479	2,780	1,856	2,366
Rubber and Manufactures	22,061	8,305	7,238	3,152
Cellulose, Cardboard and Paper	35,640	38,301	3,380	6,243
Fuel, Lubricants, Bitumens	4	227	43	26
Non-metallic Minerals and Manufactures	231	3,002	188	1,737
Ores, Metals and Manufactures	158,428	305,269	2,225	4,373
Vehicles	369,354	479,981	4,883	7,212
Machinery and Equipment	835,396	1,044,825	36,809	57,434
Electric Machinery and Appliances				
Instruments and Apparatus				
Printed Matter, Films and Fancy Articles				
Total Exports	3,082,103	3,228,135	158,601	183,673
				244,060

*Converted from thousands of dinars to thousands of dollars at the following rates: 1950-1951, \$0.02; 1952, \$0.0033.

Source: Yugoslav Federal Statistical Office. Statistics of Foreign Trade of the FPR of Yugoslavia, 1951 and 1952.

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ANNEX I--Table 10

Yugoslavia: Imports by Commodity Groups a/

Calendar Years 1935-39 to 1954
(Millions of U.S. Dollars)

Commodity	1935- 1939	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952 c/	1953 c/	1954 c/
Vegetable and Animal Products	8.0	--	11.1	17.8	21.6	22.8	128.7	86.8	134.0	47.6
Timber	0.8	--	0.5	0.4	1.1	--	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.4
Hides and Products	3.2	--	8.9	18.3	17.5	9.2	9.3	4.3	5.0	7.0
Textiles	35.0	2.1	41.0	83.0	74.0	59.4	72.3	48.3	53.0	55.0
Chemical Products	13.1	5.5	20.7	33.4	25.5	22.8	36.4	28.3	34.0	37.0
Fuel	5.6	8.1	16.0	28.5	28.8	21.6	29.6	28.6	28.0	36.0
Non-metals	3.5	4.4	7.6	9.5	7.5	7.4	4.1	8.2	4.0	7.0
Ores and Metals	14.8	4.9	21.3	51.5	113.4b/	33.2	23.8	42.4	25.0	40.0
Vehicles, Machinery, Equipment	18.7	--	37.9	72.6	--	65.7	85.5	117.9	103.0	78.0
Other Products	1.0	10.8	0.5	0.7	2.1	0.6	1.0	1.0	--	4.0
Total Including Aid	103.7	35.8	165.5	315.7	291.5	242.7	390.9	369.4 d/	384.0	312.0
Regular Imports	103.7	35.8	165.5	315.7	291.5	235.8	242.3	268.7	249.0	233.0
Economic and Food Aid	--	--	--	--	--	6.9	148.6	100.6	135.0	79.0

a/ C.I.F. Arrivals.

b/ Undoubtedly includes Vehicles, Machinery, and Equipment imports.

c/ Fiscal year import totals are as follows:

	FY 1952	FY 1953	FY 1954
Total	357.9	412.0	323.0
Regular	230.4	274.8	248.0
Aid	127.5	137.2	75.0

d/ The individual categories add up to only \$366.1 million. There may be a typographical error in source.

Sources:

1. 1935-39 Average and years 1946-1949: International Monetary Fund, Report on Yugoslavia, December 1951, Table 18.
2. 1950-52 Table 4.
3. 1953-54 Yugoslav Documents 94 and 101, and WSA estimates.

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ANNEX I--Table 11

Yugoslavia: Exports by Commodity Groups a/

Calendar Years 1935-39 to 1954
(Millions of U.S. Dollars)

Commodity	1935- 1939	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952 b/	1953 b/	1954 b/
Vegetable and Animal Products	58.2	28.5	58.3	151.9	64.1	50.1	45.2	109.3	40.5	89.3
Timber	19.3	3.9	34.8	69.0	65.1	51.9	55.9	45.6	52.0	46.0
Hides and Products	3.2	--	4.2	3.2	1.8	1.9	2.4	1.9	1.8	2.0
Textiles	7.8	--	6.8	9.7	6.7	7.2	3.2	5.2	8.0	15.2
Chemical Products	5.5	--	15.0	12.9	6.4	3.6	8.0	10.5	8.2	11.0
Fuel	0.2	--	10.0	4.6	4.6	2.2	4.4	3.8	6.3	5.5
Non-metals	1.9	--	5.7	5.2	6.5	4.9	7.2	6.4	10.0	10.0
Ores and Metals	19.1	17.4	37.9	45.6	37.0	36.8	57.4	61.1	60.0	57.0
Vehicles, Machinery, Equipment	0.1	7.2	0.1	0.1	0.3	--	0.1	0.1	3.0	9.0
Other Products	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.1	1.0
Total	115.3	57.0	172.8	302.2	192.5	158.6	183.8	244.1	190.0	246.0

a/ FOB departures.

b/ Fiscal Year export totals are as follows: FY 1952 FY 1953 FY 1954
262.4 195.1 261.0

Sources:

1. 1935-39 Average and years 1946-1948: International Monetary Fund, Report on Yugoslavia, December 1951, Table 19.
2. 1950-52 Table 5.
3. 1953-54 Yugoslav Documents, Numbers 94 and 101, and MSA estimates.

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ANNEX I--Table 12

Yugoslavia: Exports by Countries, 1938-1952 a/
(Millions of U.S. Dollars)

Country	1938	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952
United Kingdom	11.2	0.6	4.7	18.9	37.3	29.3	33.8	34.4
Germany b/	41.8	0.6	4.8	5.2	10.8	19.9	30.7	57.7
United States	5.9	1.1	3.4	7.8	15.4	21.5	26.8	35.8
Italy	7.5	1.8	19.7	24.7	19.7	18.3	21.8	31.0
Austria	7.0	1.6	8.3	18.6	21.2	16.0	16.6	25.8
France	1.7	0.6	2.3	4.4	8.2	5.5	9.0	11.8
Netherlands	2.5	4.0	12.7	19.4	13.4	6.3	6.2	5.4
Switzerland	1.9	1.5	6.1	10.2	6.2	6.0	5.4	6.4
Belgium-Luxembourg	7.8	0.1	1.9	6.7	4.2	4.8	4.2	4.6
Egypt	0.9	0.3	3.0	9.9	3.3	6.6	4.4	6.0
Sweden	0.7	0.0	2.1	8.6	5.3	4.7	2.2	2.5
Czechoslovakia	9.2	14.6	31.1	48.6	8.6	--	--	--
USSR	--	23.3	28.6	45.5	9.5	--	--	--
Hungary	5.0	0.3	14.5	26.8	5.1	--	--	--
Poland	1.7	1.5	6.0	23.7	3.8	--	--	--
Rumania	1.2	0.7	1.5	3.1	0.3	--	--	--
Other Countries	10.3	4.4	22.2	20.3	20.0	19.7	22.6	22.7
Total	116.2	57.0	172.8	302.2	192.3	158.6	183.7	244.1

a/ Exports of countries of destination.

b/ Trade limited to West Germany after 1948.

Sources:

1. 1938-1949 Yugoslav Ministry of Finance.
2. 1950-1952 Yugoslav Federal Statistical Office, Statistics of Foreign Trade of the FPR of Yugoslavia, 1951 and 1952.

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ANNEX I--Table 13

Yugoslavia: Imports by Countries, 1938-1952 a/
(Millions of U.S. Dollars)

Country	1938	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952
United States	6.9	1.3	6.8	10.6	24.9	48.6	146.6	71.3
Germany b/	37.3	1.0	6.7	13.2	15.8	39.7	44.8	74.8
Italy	10.2	2.4	14.7	33.7	34.1	25.1	36.9	30.2
United Kingdom	9.9	0.1	8.5	14.5	37.9	16.8	30.6	25.2
Austria	7.9	2.0	5.0	14.7	25.6	17.5	15.2	25.4
France	3.3	0.1	4.2	6.1	8.0	5.9	14.4	28.2
Belgium-Luxembourg	1.1	0.0	3.8	17.0	14.8	3.8	11.2	23.2
Netherlands	1.3	2.9	11.1	22.7	25.5	8.5	8.2	7.8
Switzerland	2.2	0.7	4.2	12.8	19.5	6.1	7.5	6.2
Egypt	0.9	0.0	0.2	5.8	9.5	10.4	1.8	2.5
Sweden	0.8	0.0	1.5	5.2	7.4	3.2	2.8	3.3
Czechoslovakia	12.2	6.2	30.2	55.3	18.0	--	--	--
Poland	0.9	2.7	5.3	23.1	6.7	--	--	--
Hungary	4.4	0.4	8.4	13.9	8.5	--	--	--
USSR	0.1	11.9	35.0	33.7	4.7	--	--	--
Rumania	2.4	0.8	1.0	5.4	1.1	--	--	--
Other Countries	12.8	3.4	18.9	27.8	29.4	50.2	70.8	71.3
Total	114.6	35.9	165.4	315.7	291.4	235.8	390.8	369.4
Regular Imports							242.2	268.7
Food Relief and Economic Aid							148.6	100.6

a/ Imports by countries of origin.
b/ Trade limited to West Germany after 1948.

Sources:

1. 1938-1949 National Bank of Yugoslavia.
2. 1950-1952 Yugoslav Federal Statistical Office, Statistics of Foreign Trade of the FPR of Yugoslavia, 1951 and 1952.

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